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highly respected, and no one thought of the *Herald* as an oracle. But Greeley had become the journalistic representative of the conscience of the North. Only Governor Seward knew what unworthy passions had warped the great editor, and until 1860 Seward kept that knowledge to himself.

In the last two chapters Mr. Linn presents the evidences of Greeley's decline and fall, his fierce yearning for office, his jealousy of Raymond and the *Times*, his puerile egotism and lack of balance, his distrust and captious criticism of Lincoln, his friendliness with the more disreputable elements of the local Republican party who followed the fortunes of Reuben E. Fenton, and finally the extraordinary pliability which made him the presidential candidate of his lifelong enemies.

Incidentally Mr. Linn makes it plain that Greeley profited by the advice and assistance of a remarkable company of associates. Men like Henry J. Raymond, Sidney Howard Gay, Charles A. Dana, and George Ripley helped to make the *Tribune*, to build up the influence of its editor-in-chief, and to correct the vagaries of that versatile genius. Mr. Linn barely glances at the vulgarities of speech and manner which so often made Greeley appear to his companions like an overgrown and badly-trained boy. Indeed, if the gossip that still circulates among those who knew Greeley is true, it would be impossible to put in print a faithful description of the man in his petty moods, and yet he was the very soul of courtesy and tenderness to those who could claim his affection, and even to those who could not he was often over-generous.

A man of genius and a lovable nature, he was, nevertheless, as Mr. Linn suggests, a living illustration of the need of a thorough training in the schools. Horace Greeley educated himself by native intellectual force, but it is clear that he never acquired that sanity, steadiness of judgment, and self-control which are among the finest flowers of character, and which may be cultivated amid the formative intimacies of college life. Mr. Linn's study of the great editor should be read as a companion volume to Greeley's *Recollections of a Busy Life*. With the two works in hand, it should be easy to evoke once more the attractive, powerful, and yet disappointing personality of Horace Greeley.

CHARLES H. LEVERMORE.

The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson. By DAVID MILLER DEWITT. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1903. Pp. 646.)

THIS book is one of the most important which have yet appeared dealing with that comparatively untouched field, the Reconstruction period. It is something more than an account of the impeachment and trial; it is also a picture-gallery and presents several old faces in colors not altogether familiar to students or creditable to the originals. The introduction, more than one hundred pages, is devoted to a statement of the theories and problems of Reconstruction and to an account of the struggle between the President and Congress to carry out their respective

plans. The rest of the book gives a very full account of the various unsuccessful attempts at impeachment, the impeachment, the trial, and the acquittal. Speeches made in Congress and by the President are epitomized and quoted freely. The book might very well be called "The Vindication of Andrew Johnson," but, be it said to the credit of the author, in vindicating a much maligned President he has seldom displayed offensive partizanship; he has simply allowed the actors in this not very creditable drama to speak for themselves.

It has frequently been charged that President Johnson was largely responsible for bringing on the conflict with Congress. Professor Burgess, who certainly cannot be charged with partiality toward Congress, says that he was "low-born and low-bred, violent in temper, obstinate, coarse, and lacking in the sense of propriety." But if he displayed violence of temper and vindictiveness of spirit, Mr. Dewitt shows that he did so under great provocation. Even his conduct on the famous "swing around the circle," which affords a good example of his coarseness and lack of dignity, may be explained, though not excused. Up to and including the veto of the Freedman's Bureau bill, the President can hardly be said to have done anything to provoke Congress except to point out with irrefutable logic the unconstitutional ground upon which Congress was treading. Soon after this followed the notorious speech of February 22, in which he used language unbecoming to his station and highly exasperating to Congress. Yet Senator Sherman pointed out that he had been provoked by men in and out of Congress who had classed him with Arnold and Burr and had said that he deserved to lose his head as Charles I. had done.

Over against this combative disposition of the President the author has set forth the characters of his leading opponents. Thaddeus Stevens is described as the "soul of vindictiveness" and is compared to Marat for the "audacity" of his convictions. The liminary provisions of the Constitution gave him no trouble. This leader of the opposition was also a leader in insolence, as is shown by his ironical defense of the President against the charge that he was "an insolent drunken brute, in comparison with whom even Caligula's horse was respectable." Sumner is compared to Robespierre in his indifference to the lives of men who threw themselves in his way. Human rights, in the abstract, were the object of his intellectual worship, though he cared naught for the individuals to whom the rights belonged. If there was any doubt about the guilt of this "successor of Jefferson Davis", said he, it should be resolved according to the "law of the majority." The President's "barefaced treachery" made him "alone in bad eminence, alone in the evil he has done." This characterization is all the more surprising since even Senator Ross credits Sumner with a desire to deal fairly with the President.¹

The attempt of Ashley, Butler, and Boutwell to implicate Johnson in the assassination of Lincoln is not very creditable either to their honesty, mental penetration, or sense of justice. Boutwell clung to the notorious

¹ *Forum*, XX. 222.

Conover, *alias* Dunham, who implicated Johnson in the plot, even after being confronted with his perjury ; and Ashley actually sought to secure the pardon of this scoundrel by the President in order to secure through the man thus set free evidence convicting of complicity in the murder of his predecessor the one who exercised the clemency.

It is now generally acknowledged that Grant comes out of this controversy with a record by no means enviable. According to Mr. Dewitt's account, which bears the stamp of veracity, if Grant's own admissions may be relied upon, the general's conduct in failing to hold the office of secretary of war or to deliver it to the President after the Senate refused to sanction the dismissal of Stanton cannot be very easily palliated. There seems to be no question that up to the time of his surrender of the office to Stanton, Grant left upon the mind of the President the impression that he accepted the office *ad interim* as his friend in order to help him get rid of Stanton. But now the general admits that he accepted it for the purpose of circumventing Johnson in his wish to appeal to the courts to rid himself of an obnoxious secretary. "This tacit deception," says the President, "is allowable in the ethics of some people."

But the most discreditable record of all is that of the protean Stanton. He has been pictured as one of the few reliable patriots in Buchanan's cabinet, the Atlas whose mighty efforts saved the Union from utter ruin before the inauguration of Lincoln, and as a great war secretary. His administrative ability does not seem to be questioned, but Mr. Dewitt presents a far different account of his political career. The picture here presented is that of a double-dealer, a two-faced man, to use no harsher terms, a man who always sought to be on the winning side. There is a strange ring about the patriotism which prompted him to write to Buchanan after the outbreak of hostilities and assure him that his policy had been vindicated and that "Jeff" Davis would soon "turn out the whole concern," referring to Lincoln's cabinet. While "cursing Mr. Lincoln himself with bitter curses" for suppressing freedom of speech, he was on terms of intimacy with the radical element of his cabinet and approving "important passages" recommending freeing and arming the slaves in their reports. At last he succeeded in working himself into Lincoln's cabinet, an appointment made with reluctance at the earnest solicitation of Secretary Cameron. Throughout the first two years of Johnson's administration he gave his support in most cases and his cordial acquiescence in others to the most of the President's plans, but at the same time kept up a sort of connection with the radical element in Congress. When the Tenure-of-Office bill was laid before the cabinet, no member was more emphatic than Stanton in his views as to its unconstitutionality. But soon after the passage of this bill he threw off the mask.

The shamelessness of the Senate is laid completely bare. That body was deliberately packed in violation of law and justice for the avowed purpose of bringing about condemnation. Senators declared their intention to vote for condemnation even before the evidence had been heard. Proof? What need of proof beyond "common fame," "common re-

port of misconduct"? Evidence vital to the defense was deliberately shut out. The pressure brought to bear upon doubtful senators to secure their votes for condemnation would have been unworthy of a Tudor Parliament passing a bill of attainder. This was done in no haphazard way, but systematically, by the "Union Congressional Committee," to which even senators belonged. But all to no purpose. In spite of a mosaic article patched up out of the others in the hope of securing the doubtful votes for conviction by the "obscurity of its charges and the intricacy of its forms," the one vote necessary was lacking, and Andrew Johnson was acquitted.

But the vindictive House was not satisfied. Spies had been set upon the President and Chief-Justice Chase, and now a movement was set on foot to investigate whether the acquittal had not been secured by bribery, pointing directly at Senator Ross. This, however, the Senate resented.

It is one of the ironies of history that the President's accusers should now stand condemned on the very charges which they brought against him — vindictiveness, coarseness, lack of dignity. While they were nervous, excited, peevish, irascible, and abusive, he was calm, dignified, even cheerful, demeaning himself as an extraordinary man. One thing in particular which is indicative of nobility of character was his suppression of the reason of Black's withdrawal from the defense at a time when this was being thrown in his face as a sign of the weakness of his cause. Is the reader surprised at this picture, or series of pictures, presented by the author? They appear to have been made up of material the reliability of which it would be hard to impeach.

In spite of the flimsy character of the charges, this trial was a highly dramatic event. The suspense of the country was intense and the commonly-accepted notion is that the same was true of the Senate until Senator Ross had answered "Not Guilty." Herein the author has shown his ability to appreciate dramatic effect and has imparted to the reader something of the suspense which held a nation's breath. There is a story to the effect that the suspense was not so great in the Senate, at least on the part of all; that, in fact, there was some kind of an arrangement for the acquittal of the President. However, this story, which is hardly more creditable to the Senate than the trial, has never been fully proved and does not deserve repetition here.

On the whole the style is good, but a few slips occur. The author refers to "Hancock's celebrated order" (p. 315), but does not explain what that order was. At page 325 he says that Grant had been "engaged in a conference with General Sherman and many little matters." He also tells us that "Sumner out with the naked truth" (p. 190). The expression "of like kidney" is rather offensive to a reader of refined taste.

DAVID Y. THOMAS.